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This paper examines when and to what extent an individual's
relative wage depends on hisjher productivity relative to others
doing the same job. Starting wages were inf1uenced by background
characteristics and training cost realizations but not by relative
productivity. Wages one year later were inf1uenced by productivity
but the effects were small. The wage elasticity was .2 at small
establishments and 0 at establishments with over 400 employees.
The wage response to relative productivity and training costs was
weaker in small labor markets, suggesting that wages do not fully
respond to performance because of the firm specificity of job
performance differentials.
Most hiring selections are based on very incomplete information. In
part, this is a consequence of the remarkably small investment that most
employers make in their hiring decisions. Small employers, for example,
consider, on the average, only nine applications, interview only 4.5
applicants, and devote less than 10 hours of staff time to filling each
position (Barron and Bishop 1985). Even more important is the notorious
unreliability of most predictors of job performance such as the interview.
The paper is based on research that was funded by the U.S. Department of
Labor and the u.s. Department of Education.
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Mayfield (I 964, p. 249) concludes a review of the literature with the
statement, "The interview as normally conducted in a selection situation
is of little value." Recipients of job offers are also poorly informed about
many features of the job and about their alternative opportunities.
The poor quality of the information available when hiring decisions
are made means that the terms agreed to may need to be changed if
nonoptimal separations are to be avoided (Hashimoto and Yu 1980).
Negotiation costs increase with tenure, however, because the individual
develops firm-specific human capital and the rents to be divided grow
in size. Consequently, formal renegotiation of employment contracts
and its cousin, offer matching, are uncommon except for occupations
such as sports, art, and research in which productivity is both highly
visible and highly variable. More common are long-term contracts in
which the more reliable party-the employer-promises to award wage
increases and promotions on the basis of performance. This contract
form is by no means universal, however, and, even where it prevails,
there are often severe constraints on how key features of the contract,
such as the wage, vary with measured performance. What are the optimal
parameters of such contracts? How prevalent are such contracts? What
are their terms? What is the effect of a worker's relative productivity on
his or her relative wage? Which firms are likely to offer such contracts?
These are the questions to be addressed in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I is a discussion of the
factors that influence the optimality of contracts in which the employer
awards bonuses or wage increases that depend on measures of job
performance. Section II examines the degree to which employer percep-
tions of job performance influence relative wage rates. Estimates of the
elasticity of relative wages with respect to relativ~ productivity (as
perceived by the wage setter) and how this elasticity varies by establish-
ment size, unionization, and the size of the local labor market are
presented. The final section summarizes the empirical findings, relates
them to theory, and speculates on policy implications.
I. The Optimal Relation between Productivity
and Wage Rates
The widespread use of formal performance appraisal implies that most
employers believe they can rate the productivity of their employees.
Adjusting relative wage rates to reflect relative productivity produces
three kinds of benefits for the firm. First, it serves as an incentive for
greater effort. Second, it tends to attract to the firm more able workers
and those who like to work hard (Freeman 1977). Third, it reduces the
probability of losing the best performers to other firms and raises the
probability that the least productive workers will leave. On the other
hand, information about a worker's effort and productivity is often
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costly to obtain, and the information asymmetries that these costs create
often make it optimal to limit the adjustment of the wage rates to
productivity. There are at least six reasons for this: (1) the inevitability
of significant errors in measuring productivity, (2) variations over time
in a worker's relative productivity, (3) productivity differentials that are
either specific to the firm or not visible to other employers, (4) risk
aversion, (5) deferred compensation of outstanding performance, and (6)
other forms of reward for greater productivity.
Measurement Costs
The first explanation is the high cost of accurately measuring a
particular worker's productivity. In most jobs, an objective measure of
productivity simply does not exist. This is part of the reason why, in
November 1975, only 1.2% of the nation's workers were paid on a
piece-rate basis and only 1.9% on a pure commission basis (Flaim 1979).
In most work environments, productivity-based wage setting would have
to use subjective evaluations by immediate supervisors. These supervisory
assessments are known to contain measurement error. Meta-analyses of
supervisor-rating studies have found that .6 is the upper bound on the
correlation between the ratings given the same worker by two different
raters (King, Hunter, and Schmidt 1980). Even more significant are the
even lower correlations of supervisor ratings with carefully designed
work sample measures of performance. The mean correlation is .42 in
studies of civilian jobs and .27 in studies of jobs in the armed forces
(Hunter 1983). If the purpose of merit pay is to forestall the loss of the
most productive employees and the firm's measure of the productivity
of individual workers is subject to error, the optimal wage-setting rule
results in wages only partially adjusting to measured differences in
productivity (Hashimoto and Yu 1980). If supervisory ratings and work
samples are equally reliable and measurement error is random, an effort
to set wages equal to expected marginal product would lead to a
supervisory perception of a 10% productivity differential, resulting in a
4.2% wage differentia!.!
Productivity Varies over Time
One of the reasons why productivity is difficult to measure is that it
varies over time. The consistency of worker performance is greatest
when conditions of work are stable, but, in the typical environment in
which work environment is changing, correlations of output rates for
1 Assume l = p' + u, cov(p', u) = 0, p'" = p' + v, cov(p', v) = 0, cov(u, v)
=
0, V(u)
=
V(v), and row= .42; then, when p' = Bpo is estimated, B = var(p')/
var(l) = .42. If, instead, the purpose of merit pay is to provide an incentive for
effort, if measurement error is uncorrelated with true productivity, and if workers
are not risk averse, then the optimal wage-setting rule sets wage equal to
measured productivity.
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adjacent weeks range from .48 (Rothe and N ye 1961) to .69 (Rothe
1947), averaging .585 across four studies. If employers try to forestall
the loss of their most productive employees by setting wage rates equal
to the next-period expected productivity, the lack of performance
consistency will result in an elasticity of future wage rates with respect
to current productivity that is less than one.
The lack of performance consistency over time accounts for some of
the differences between supervisor ratings of the same employee, so
averages of past ratings are likely to be a better predictor of future
performance than any single rating. Supervisor ratings, however, are
influenced by previous ratings, so errors in measuring performance are
not independent. Workers develop reputations (that may not be deserved)
that influence later supervisors. Consequently, averaging ratings from
many different years only moderately improves the employer's ability to
predict the next-period true productivity.
Differentials That Are Specific to the Firm
Third, productivity differentials between workers at a firm might
reflect differences in skills that are specific to the firm or known only
by the firm. If the worker is not able to translate high productivity with
the current employer into a higher wage offer at another firm, the
competitive pressure on the current employer to raise the individual's
wage is reduced. Even if all productivity differentials within the firm
reflect differences in generalized competence, it is very difficult in most
jobs for other employers to measure these differentials accurately and,
thus, base wage and job offers on them. Performance appraisals are
almost invariably confidential (Lawler 1981). Most of the sources of
information available to other employers are not reliable. Self-reports of
productivity are properly treated with skepticism. References from past
employers tend to be bland. Separating employees who have felt that
they were unable to get a good job because of a poor recommendation
have successfully sued their previous employer. This has made most
employers reluctant to talk about their past employees. An illustration
of this reluctance is provided by the following quote: "We warn our
managers all the time. If someone calls you on the phone and asks you
about someone who has left the company, you refer them to personnel.
You don't say word one to them. You could be put in the position
where you are going to be in court some day" (personnel director,
Nationwide Insurance, Columbus, Ohio, 1985).
Thus, a major share of the productivity differences between workers
at the firm are either irrelevant to or invisible to other employers and,
hence, are functionally specific to the firm. When forestalling tUrnover
is the reason for offering bigger wage increases to more productive
workers, the optimal response of within-firm wage differentials to
measured differences in expected productivity specific to the firm is
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equal to the worker's share of investments in specific human capital
(Hashimoto and Yu 1980). In Bishop and Kang's (1984) model of wage
determination, the worker's share is
[ 1
(1+rfirm)I/JO/pr(k)
]
-1
+ (1 + rperson)l/J/pr(s) , (1)
where the required rates of return for the firm and the worker are,
respectively, rfirmand rperson'The expression I/Jo/pr(k) is the proportionate
change in the probability of not being dismissed per unit change in
second-period wage rate; I/J/pr(s) is the proportionate change in the
probability of not quitting per unit change in the wage. When quits are
highly responsive to the wage and fires are not, wage differences reflect
differences in specific productivity. When fires are more responsive to
the wage than quits are, wages respond less to differences in specific
productivity. These implications will be tested in the empirical work.
Risk Aversion
A fourth reason why the contracts that govern the employment
relationship may specify only partial adjustment of relative wages to
relative productivity is worker risk aversion. Realized productivity is
often influenced by random factors such as the territory, machine,
coworker, or supervisor to which the worker is assigned. If wages vary
dollar for dollar with measured productivity, the worker is forced to
accept a great deal of risk. Most workers would like to avoid such risks,
so the optimal contract is a compromise between full and zero incor-
poration of realized productivity into the wage. Exactly where the
compromise is struck depends on the strength of worker risk aversion,
the responsiveness of effort to reward, and the variance of the random
element (Cheung 1969; Stiglitz 1974). If firms can monitor the worker's
effort, worker risk aversion will induce firms to offer contracts in which
pay is based primarily on effort rather than on realized output (Harris
and Raviv 1979). This further reduces the dependence of wages on
realized productivity. Risk aversion also reduces the dependence of pay
on past productivity when effort is exogenous and the purpose of merit
pay is the retention of the firm's most productive employees (Free-
man 1977).
Deferred Compensation
A fifth reason for expecting the immediate response of relative wage
rates to relative productivity to be small is that extra compensation for
outstanding performance is often deferred. A merit increase in year 1
raises wage rates in later years even if the outstanding performance of
year 1. is not repeated. Consequently, for workers anticipating 100,Jg
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tenure (or expecting to retire on a defined benefit plan keyed to salary
in the last few years), the present value of a merit increase is considerably
greater than its first-year effect. If anticipated tenure is short, however,
deferred rewards for outstanding performance will not be attractive to a
worker. This implies that firms with high rates of turnover would find
that bonuses provide a more effective motivation for effort than merit
increases. Indeed, bonuses and commissions are common forms of
compensation in such high-turnover occupations as selling automobiles
and insurance. From the firm's point of view, the reason for deferring
rewards is that it simultaneously (1) rewards effort in period 1, (2)
discourages turnover of the best performers in all future periods, and (3)
encourages the weak performers to leave voluntarily.
Other Forms of Compensation
A sixth reason why differences in relative productivity may not be
reflected in wages is that the firm is recognizing the greater productivity
in other ways (e.g., praise, desirable job assignments, greater autonomy,
and lower likelihoods of layoff). If, for instance, a worker's satisfaction
with a job (utility) is influenced by his or her relative status in the firm
or among coworkers as well as by the absolute level of the wage, a
merit increase or promotion generates two kinds of benefits for the
worker: a somewhat higher wage and a movement up the firm's status
hierarchy (Frank 1984). The greater the perceived importance of relative
status, the smaller are the wage increases necessary to motivate workers
to put out maximum effort.
II. The Effect of Relative Productivity on Relative Wage
Rates: Empirical Findings
To what extent are differentials in productivity (relative to one's
coworkers with the same amount of tenure) incorporated into relative
wage rates? The u.s. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) periodically asks
employers to describe the method they employ in setting wages. Table
1 presents the results of BLS surveys between 1968 and 1970 of firms
with more than 50 employees. More than half the plant workers and
14% of white-collar workers had their wages set by a system that took
no account of differences in productivity. The others either had their
pay set individually or were on a range-of-rates system in which wage
increases were based fully or partially on merit (Cox 1971). These
surveys, however, provide no measure of the magnitude of the wage-
rate response to merit and also lack coverage of people working in
smaller establishments.
The National Center for Research in Vocational Education Employer
Survey conducted in late spring 1982 provides a unique data set for
examining the determinants and the parameters of merit-based pay. It
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Table 1
Method of Wage Determination in Establishments
with 50 or More Employees
Plant Workers
(%)
Office \XIorkers(%)
Evervone paid same rate
Range with progression based on:
Seniorirv
Merit'
Both merit and seniorirv
Pay set individually
.
Individual incenti~e
Group incentive
36 3
16
9
12
13
10
..
II
36
21
28
0
0
Total 100 100
SoURCE.-U.5. Bureau of Labor Statistics area wage sun-en in 85 urban areas
between 1%8 and 1970 (Cox 1971).
provides retrospectively longitudinal data on the wage rates, turnover,
and reported productivity of a pair of new hires for the same (or a
similar) job at 659 different firms. Most of the respondents were owners
or managers of small firms who were quite familiar with the performance
of each of the firm's employees. At larger firms, interviews were typically
conducted with both the personnel director and a line supervisor. The
personnel director provided information on the company and the
background of two recently hired employees, and the supervisor provided
data on the training costs and productivity of the two new employees.
These data are described in greater detail in the Appendix. The first
member of the pair of recently hired employees was obtained by asking
the main respondent to select "the last new employee your company
hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether that person is still
employed by your company." The second member of the pair was
obtained by asking the employer to select "another employee you hired
[within the past 2 years] for the same or similar position but with some
prior vocational training." In the event that the first person selected had
prior vocational training, the second person selected was not to have
had such training. Except for the fact that the two new hires are selected
to have different amounts of vocational training, this procedure results
in a random selection of two workers hired for the same or a similar
job.2 Seventy percent of these workers were still at the firm at the time
of the interview.
2Differences in vocational training account for very few of the differences in
wage-rates, productivity and training costs, so the requirement that the two
workers have different amounts of vocational training has only a minor effect
on estimates of the variance of worker productivity and training costs.
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Given the well-known difficulties of measuring productivity accurately,
it would be surprising indeed if relative wages of workers with only a
year or so of tenure at a firm completely ref1ected their productivity
relative to their coworkers in the job. On the other hand, the benefits
of merit-based pay-greater effort, self-selection of more productive
workers, and retention of the better performers-are likely to be
important enough to require some recognition of relative productivity
in wage increase and turnover decisions. Consequently, the empirical
work in this and later sections tests both whether relative productivity
has a positive effect on relative wage rates and whether the elasticity of
relative wage rates with respect to relative productivity is less than one.
The econometric framework for examining the extent to which wages
ret1ect actual differences in productivity will now be presented. Assume
that the ith worker's wage relative to the mean for the job is described
by the following equation:
Wij- Wj =bt(Pij- Pj) +b2(Tij- Tj) + B(Xij- Xj)+ Uji> (2)
where
Wi) - Wj = the deviation of the individual wage from the mean for
workers with similar tenure;
Pij - P) = the deviation of the individual's productivity from the
mean for workers with the same amount of tenure;
Tij - Tj = the difference between the training individual i needs to
perform satisfactorily and that needed by the typical new
hire;
Xij - Xj = a vector of differences in credentials, background
characteristics, and tenure between the individual and the
mean for other new hires; and
Ui) = individual specific error term.
Data are not available on the means (Wi>Pj, Tj, and Xj), so equation
(2) cannot be estimated. For many firms, however, there are data on two
workers doing the same job, so the following equation for the difference
between the wage rates of person 1 and person 2 can be estimated:
Wtj- W2j= bt(Plj- P2j)+biTlj- T2j) + B(X1j- X2j) + Ulj- U2j. (3)
We expect the coefficient for productivity to be positive and the
coefficient for training to be negative. The coefficient on training is
expected to be negative because workers who get more than average
amounts of training do so primarily because they are slow learners or
because their previous training and experience is weak. Even where
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additional training reflects a decision to prepare the worker for a more
highly skilled job, it should have a negative effect on wages while the
training is occurring because some of that training is general and the
worker must pay for it. The second hypothesis is that firms only partially
adjust their wage rate to observed productivity and training investment
(e.g., bl will be less than one). .
Two equations for wage rates, one for the logarithm of the starting
wage rate and the other for the logarithm of the latest wage rate, were
estimated. For most of the workers who were still at the firm, the latest
wage is the wage rate at the time of the interview, which is generally
about a year after they were hired. For the workers who had separated,
the latest wage rate was the wage immediately preceding the separation.
The sample was limited to pairs of individuals both of whom had stayed
at the firm at least 3 months. The Appendix describes the data set
employed in the analysis and the method by which training investment
and reported productivity were measured.
A simple model relating relative wages to relative productivity and
relative training time but not to background characteristics of the worker
is presented in columns 1 and 3 of table 2. The starting wage is set
before the new hire starts work, so one would not expect productivity
realizations to have as strong an effect on starting wages as on current
wages. This expectation is confirmed, for the elasticity of starting wage
rates with respect to productivity is only .08, while the elasticity of latest
wage rates with respect to productivity is .22.3
Some employers are, apparently, able to anticipate when a new hire
will require extra training and to offer lower wage rates to new hires
who require extra training. The response of the wage to training costs
is small, however. A 100-hour increase in training during the first 3
months-the cost of which is equivalent to one-fifth of an experienced
worker's potential productivity-reduces the new hire's starting and
latest wages by only 3.4%. The small size of this response suggests that
most of the training in the first 3 months is functionally specific to the
firm or that most employers are unable to anticipate how much
additional training an inexperienced worker is going to require.
The finding that the elasticity of relative wage rates with respect to
relative productivity is significantly below one implies that wages for
workers who have been at a firm for about a year only partially reflect
person-to-person variations in reported productivity on the job. The
person who provided these productivity reports was, in most cases, the
owner or manager of a small establishment (70% had fewer than 50
employees) and was thus quite frequently the person who decides on
3 The elasticities were calculated by assuming a 1% increase (at the mean) in
each of the three productivity reports.
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Table 2
Effect of Worker Productivity on Wage Rates
Startin~ Wa~e Latest Wa~e
(I) (2) (3) (4)
Trainin~ time (IOOsof hours)
- .033'" -.020" -.033" -.024(3.09) (1.99) (2.39) (1041)
Produn;vitv:
St'com! \~eek .146" .090 .102 .052
(2.4X) (1.47) (1..>2) (.60)
Third week to twelfth week .026 -.006 -.011 -.008
(.32) (.10) (.10) (.OX)
At interview or separation -.010 -.011
.215'" .211'"(.22) (.26) (3.69) (3.56)
Relevant experience
.0155'" .0093'
(4.54) (1.94)
Relevant experience squared
-.0002X'"
-
.00027
(2.26) (1.55)
Total experience
.0080'" .0074'"(4.10) (2,68)
Total e'xperience squared
- .00020'" -.000141'(3.61) (1.81)
Years of schoolin~
.011'" .012"(2.87) (2.23)
Relevant vocational education
.040'" .031'(3.39) (1.87)
Private' vocational education .006 .026
(.24) (.67)
Female
-.039' -.026
(I.X5) (.87)
Known to be Tarftete'd Jobs
Tax Credit e i~ible -.062
-.164'"(1.66) (3.09)
Union referral 0430'" .125(4.7X) (.9X)
Tenure (years)
.051'" .065(2.74) (3.48)
Tenure sq uared
-
.0022 -.004
(.74) (1041)
Obsl'rvations (N) 470 456 470 456
R' .173 .360 .23X .302
NOTF..- This table is based on fixed-effects models that compare two new hires for the same or a similar
job at a firm. Other variables in the model were whether the job was temporary. whether the individual
was a student, hours worked per week, whl,ther referred by a relative, and whether subsidized by a program
other than Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. The model for starting wage contained date of hire and date of hire
squared. Numbers in parentheses arc [-statistics.
* Significant at the 10% level (two sided).
** Significant at the S% level (two sided).
*** Significant at the 1% level (two sided).
the wage offer for each individual. The regression is therefore capturing
the relation between the productivity of individual workers as per-
ceived by the person setting wages and the wage rate that is offered and
agreed to.
In the absence of good direct measures of worker productivity, the
employer will probably use background characteristics as signals for
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predicting the productivity of new employees. As the firm learns more
about a worker, we would expect wage decisions to depend more on
observed productivity and less on background characteristics. Background
characteristics should continue to have some role in determining wage
rates, however, because (1) errors in measuring productivity leave a role
for other variables that are correlated with true productivity and (2)
most productivity differentials are probably functionally specific to the
firm, and background traits affect the worker's threat point (marketability
elsewhere) in the bargaining over the division of the rents generated by
a better-than-average match. Many of the signals normally available to
those making the hiring decision-age, sex, education, and previous
relevant work experience-are also included in the data. It was, therefore,
possible to test these hypotheses by modeling differentials in starting
and latest wage rates as a function of differentials in both the signals of
productivity and the measures of actual productivity. The results are
presented in columns 2 and 4 of table 2.
The worker's background characteristics have large and significant
effects on both starting and latest relative wage rates even when observed
productivity is controlled. Traits that signal general human capital such
as total experience and years of schooling have roughly equal effects on
both initial and later wage rates. Holding work experience in a relevant
job constant, an additional 5 years of total experience raises both starting
and later wage rates by 3.3%-3.5%, and an additional year of schooling
raises relative wage rates by 1.1%-1.2'Yo.
Traits that signal occupation- or industry-specific human capital tend
to have a smaller effect on later wage rates than on starting wage rates.
Holding realized productivity and total experience constant, 5 years of
relevant work experience raise wage rates by 7% at the start but by only
4% at the time of the interview. Being a referral from a union has an
extremely large effect on starting wages but a much smaller effect on
current wages. Including background characteristics in the model raises
the R2 of the starting wage model from .173 to .360. For the latest wage,
the increment to R2 is smaller, from .209 to .302. The greater importance
of background characteristics in the starting wage model suggests that
the value of these signals (as predictors of productivity) diminishes as
the firm learns more about its new employee.
What is the unique effect of observed productivity when background
characteristics are controlled? The findings are that realized productivity
has almost no effect on the starting wage when background is controlled
but large and significant effects on wage rates after a year or so at the
firm. In the starting wage model, none of the coefficients on realized
productivity variables is statistically significant, and the implied elasticity
is only .03. In the latest wage model, the effect of current productivity
is large and statistically significant. The elasticity of wage rates with
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respect to productivity is . I9, marginally below the .22 of the simple
model that excludes background characteristics but includes tenure. This
means that, while starting wages are based on background characteristics
and credentials, later wage rates increasingly depend on actual job
performance. Workers are rewarded for doing a better-than-average job.
The conclusion that relative wage rates at interview or separation
depend on realized productivity as well as worker characteristics is
subject to challenge, however, if employers set wage rates on the basis
of worker characteristics such as recommendations from previous em-
ployers and aptitude test scores that are not available to the researcher.
If such information is available to the employer and it has a continuing
effect on wages even after the new hire has been at the firm for a year,
the productivity measures will tend to pick up the effects of these
omitted worker characteristics, and the coefficients on current and lagged
productivity will have a positive bias. I examined the presence of omitted
variables in wage equations by jointly estimating the starting and latest
wage equations using a seemingly unrelated regression technique. Evidence
that some of the determinants of relative wage rates are not included in
the models is provided by the fact that there is a positive correlation of
.4 between the errors of the two equations. Any possible bias produced
by an omitted characteristic, however, seems to be very small. For the
latest wage, it is only the contemporaneously measured productivity
variable that has a large positive effect on the wage, and actual productivity
in the first 2 weeks and the next 10 weeks shows no significant impact.
Also, in the starting wage model, actual productivity in the first 2 weeks
has the largest positive effect, and productivity 1 year after being hired
has a tiny, nonsignificant negative effect. This pattern of coefficients
suggests that (1) stable omitted worker characteristics are not a significant
source of bias for the coefficients on the productivity variables in the
model of the latest wage and (2) wages adapt quickly, though not
completely, to the realized productivity of the new worker.
Where Is Merit-Based Pay Most Prevalent?
One would not expect all firms to be equally able or inclined to adjust
relative wage rates to the realized relative productivity of workers. Small
establishments and nonunion establishments are expected to be more
likely to base wage increases on a worker's productivity. Large establish-
ments are less likely to use merit pay because productivity is more
difficult to measure and skills are more firm specific than at small
establishments. In most jobs, merit pay will have to be based on
subjective judgments. This is not a severe problem in small firms in
which the owner is very familiar with each worker's performance. In
large establishments, merit wage increases must be based on the opinions
of line supervisors, who may misperceive the criteria to be used. If a
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union represents the workers, the ability and inclination of management
to adjust wages to productivity is reduced even further. The greater
specificity of skills in large firms arises partly from greater specialization
of function and partly from the fact that large establishments face fewer
competitors for labor (Oi 1982).
The effective specificity of skills also depends on the size of the local
labor market. In a large labor market, skills are effectively more general.
Workers have a greater range of choices, and quits are likely to be more
responsive to relative wage rates than they are in small labor markets.
Equation (1), which characterizes the sharing ratio when human capital
is specific to the firm, implies that, when quits are very responsive to
the individual's wage, employers are induced to pay higher wage rates
to their more productive employees. Consequently, the interactions
between market size and productivity are expected to have a positive
sign, and the interactions between market size and training time are
expected to have a negative sign.
These hypotheses were tested by interacting the productivities and
training differentials between two workers with unionization, establish-
ment size, and labor market size in models of the latest relative wage:
Wlj- W2j= (bl +atZj)(Plj- P2j)+ (b2+a2Zj)(Tlj- T2)
+ B(X1j- X2j) + Ulj-U2j,
(4)
where Zj is a vector of firm characteristics (deviated from sample mean),
al and a2 are vectors of coefficients on interactions with firm character-
IStICS,
£(Plj- P2j) = 0, £(Tlj- T2) = O.
The al coefficients on the size and unionization interactions were
negative as anticipated, and the at coefficient on the size/productivity
interaction was significantly negative (see table 3). At nonunion estab-
lishments with 17 employees, the elasticity of the wage with respect to
productivity is .2. Though the coefficient on the unionization interaction
is not statistically significant, its point estimate implies that a unionized
firm of that size would have a wage elasticity with respect to productivity
of .10. The results imply that the elasticity of the relative wage with
respect to relative productivity will be .09 at a nonunion establishment
with 100 employees, -.01 at a unionized establishment with 100 em-
ployees, and zero at a nonunion establishment with 400 employees.
Clearly, the relative wage rates of different workers in the same job do
not vary proportionately with their productivity. In medium-sized
unionized establishments and large nonunion establishments, there does
not seem to be any immediate response of relative wages to reported
Starting Latest
Wage Wage
Training time (lOOsof hours)
- .029** -.022(2.72) (1.53)
Productivity first 2 weeks .055 .068
(1.24) (1.00)
Productivity (most recent)
.208***
(4.38)
Size times productivity -.005 -.080**
(.16) (2.57)
Union times productivity .212 -.115
(1.32) (.52)
Labor market size times productivity -.014 .093***(048) (3.32)
Size times training -.006 .003
(.80) (.32)
Labor market size times training -.019** -.026**
(2.21) (2.27)
Union referral 0406*** .\39(4.39) (1.10)
Relevant experience .0156*** .0101
**(4.58) (2.12)
Relevant experience squared (divided by 100) -.027*** -.026
(2.21) (1.49)
Total experience .0075*** .0070**
(3.83) (2.53)
Total experience squared (divided by 100) -.019*** -.0\3*
(3.39) (1.70)
Years of schooling .011*** .010*
(2.70) (1.85)
Relevant vocational education .043*** .032*
(3.64) (1.92)
Private vocational education .006 .027
(.21) (.73)
Female
- .039* -.030(1.88) (1.02)
Known to be Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
eligible -.070* -.160***
(1.85) (3.05)
Received Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act-On-the-Job Training subsidy .007 .003
(.19) (.06)
Tenure .069***
(3.98)
Tenure squared (divided by 100) -.0037
(1.38)
Table 3
Effect of Worker Productivity on Wage Rates: Interactions with
Unionization, Establishment, and Labor Market Size
NOTE.- This table is based on fixed-effects models that compare two new hires for the same or a similar
job at the firm. Models were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. Other variables in the model
were whether the job was temporary, whether the individual was a stUdent, and hours worked per week.
The model for the latest wage also contained tenure and tenure squared. The model for starting wage
contained date of hire and the date of hire squared. The weighted R' for the system was 0.348, and the
correlation between the residuals of the two equations was 0.40. In the starting wage model, size and
unionization are interacted with productivity in the second week. In the latest wage model, interactions
are with most recent productivity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
* Significant at the 10% level (two sided).
** Significant at the 5% level (two sided).
*** Significant at the 1% level (two sided).
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relative productivity. Such establishments are underrepresented in this
data set, so the mean elasticity of .19 derived from this sam pIe exaggerates
the true average short-run response of relative wage rates to reported
relative productivity. The coefficients on the interaction between estab-
lishment size and training time are not significantly different from zero.
The interactions of labor market size with productivity and training
have the expected sign in both the starting and the latest wage models.
The training interaction is statistically significant in both models. Differ-
entials in training costs have no effect on starting wage differentials in
labor markets that are one-quarter of the sample median in size. A 100-
hour increase in training costs lowers a worker's starting wage rate by
2.6% in labor markets of median size and by 5% in labor markets of
four times the median size. Labor market size has a significant positive
effect on the responsiveness of wages to productivity. The elasticity of
latest wages with respect to productivity is .09 in labor markets that are
one-quarter of the sample median in size and .31 in labor markets of
four times the median size. These effects are large. Specifically, they are
somewhat larger than the comparable establishment size interactions.
This is surprising because labor market size interactions result only from
skill specificity, while firm size interactions are due both to monitoring
costs and to skill specificity. If labor market size and establishment size
both increase proportionately, there is very little change in the respon-
siveness of wages to relative productivity. This suggests that increased
skill specificity, not higher monitoring costs, is the primary reason why
large firms are less likely to adjust wages to productivity.
III. Summary
Important differentials between firms have been found in the prevalence
and power of merit-based pay. While a worker's reported productivity
relative to peers does have important and reasonably rapid effects on
relative wage rates at small and medium-sized nonunion establishments,
it has almost no effect at unionized establishments with more than 100
employees and at nonunion establishments with more than 400 employees.
Monitoring costs are low and skill differentials more general at the small
establishments, and, as a result, effort and productivity are rewarded by
higher wage rates. At large establishments, monitoring costs are high
and skill differentials more specific to the firm, so wages do not quickly
respond to productivity.
The second major contribution of the paper is the finding that there
are large differences in productivity between workers doing the same
job and that relative wage rates respond positively, but incompletely, to
these differentials. A recent review (Schmidt and Hunter 1983) of studies
that contained direct measures of output for different workers doing the
same job at the same firm found that the coefficient of variation of
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worker productivity, while highly variable across jobs, has a mean of
about 20% for jobs paid on an hourly or salaried basis. My estimates of
the coefficient of variation of job incumbents was .18-.19. Since there
are fixed costs to employing an individual (facilities, equipment, light,
heat, and overhead functions such as hiring and payrolling), the coefficient
of variation of net marginal product is likely to be even greater (Boudreau
1983; Klein, Spady, and Weiss 1983).
The paper presents evidence that wage-rate differentials between
workers with about 1 year of tenure only partially reflect current and
past differentials in productivity and that there is essentially no immediate
response of relative wage rates to productivity in very large establishments.
Whether compensation for greater productivity comes over a longer time
frame or in other ways cannot be tested in these data. Examination of
the effect of productivity on turnover is left to another paper. The
inevitability of significant errors in measuring productivity (that cannot
be eliminated by measuring it repeatedly), the functional specificity of
many productivity differentials, and worker risk aversion create a strong
a priori case (see See. I) that compensation for greater productivity is
often only partial, even in a present discounted value sense, for long-
tenure employees.
The third major contribution of the paper is that it challenges an
assumption-that individual wages are equal to individual marginal
products-that is a keystone of some important practical applications of
economics to public decision making in the field of education and
training such as growth accounting and social benefit/cost analysis. It
would appear that this very strong assumption may need to be replaced
by something weaker, such as the assumption that wages equal expected
marginal product given the employer's incomplete information set, or,
perhaps, by something weaker stilI, such as Jovanovich's assumption
that wages are equal to the average marginal product of all workers with
the same tenure. As a result, when training programs are being evaluated,
the possibility must be entertained that their effects on productivity (and
therefore their social benefits) may be different from their effects on
earnings (the private benefits received by trainees).
Appendix
Data and Measurement Issues
This paper is based on data from a survey of 3,412 employers
sponsored by the National Institute of Education (NIE) and the National
Center for Research in Vocational Education (NCRVE) conducted
between February and June 1982. The survey represented the second
wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers from selected
geographic areas across the country.
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The first wave was funded by the U.S. Department of Labor to collect
data on area labor market effects of its Employment Opportunity Pilot
Project (EOPP). The survey encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites and 18
comparison sites selected for their similarity to the pilot sites. The survey
design specified a strategy of oversampling firms with a relatively high
proportion of low-wage workers.
The second wave attempted to interview all the respondents in the
first-wave survey. About 70% of the original respondents completed
surveys for the second wave. In the bulk of the sample, respondents
were the owners or managers of the establishments. In large organizations,
the primary respondent was the person in charge of hiring, generally
the personnel officer. When primary respondents were unable to answer
a question, they were asked if someone else in the organization would
have the information, and that part of the interview was completed with
this other official. Other respondents included comptrollers, wage and
salary administrators, and line supervisors (for questions about a particular
recent hire). Most of the respondents were owners or managers of small
firms who were quite familiar with the performance of each of the firm's
employees.
The paper analyzes data from a subsample of employers who gave
information on two different recent hires for the same job. The 3,412
employers who received the full questionnaire were asked to select "the
last new employee your company hired prior to August 1981 regardless
of whether that person is still employed by your company." A total of
818 employers could not provide information for a recent new hire.
Most of these firms were small organizations that had not hired anyone
in recent memory. The employers that provided information on one
new hire were asked to provide data on a second new hire in the same
job but with contrasting amounts of vocational education. Of the 2,594
employers that provided data on one new hire, 1,511 had not hired
anyone else in that job in the last 2 years, and 424 had not hired anyone
with a different amount of vocational training for that position in the
last 2 years. As a result, data are available for 659 pairs of individuals
who have the same job at the same establishment. Missing data on
specific questions used in the model further reduced the sample used for
estimation to about 480. Most of the establishments from which paired
data are available are small. Seventy percent have fewer than 50 employees,
and only 12% have more than 200 employees.
Each employer surveyed was asked about the training provided to the
two new employees, current and starting hourly wage rates and an
average rate paid to workers with 2 years of experience, and the
productivity of each new hire at various points in his or her tenure. A
copy of the relevant portions of the questionnaire can be obtained from
the author on request.
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Data were obtained on the amount of time that is devoted to training
new employees during their first 3 months. Separate questions were
asked about training hours spent in formal training, informal training
by management, informal training by coworkers, and watching others
do the job.4 For the sample of firms and jobs, the means for the typical
worker were as follows: watching others do the job, 47.3 hours; formal
training programs, 10.7 hours; informal training by management, 51.0
hours, and informal training by coworkers, 24.2 hours.
A training-time index was constructed that valued and then combined
the time invested in training activities during the first 3 months on the
job. The management staff member who provided formal and informal
training was assumed to be paid 1.5 times the wage of a coworker, and
the trainee's time was valued as equal to 0.8 hours of coworker training
time. When supervisors and coworkers are giving informal training to a
new employee, the trainee is almost invariably involved directly in a
production activity. Employers report that, for informal training, the
trainees are typically as productive while being trained as they are when
working alone. Consequently, informal training is assumed to involve
only the investment of the trainer's time. The training-time index is
equal to 0.8 times the hours spent watching others do the job plus 1.8
times the hours in formaP training plus 1.5 times the hours in training
by management plus hours in training by coworkers.6 The arithmetic
mean of this index is 124 hours, implying that the value of the time
invested in training a typical new employee in the first 3 months is
about 23% of the output that a coworker would produce in 3 months.
The survey asked the employer (or, in larger firms, the immediate
supervisor) to report on productivity of each of the individuals hired
after 2 weeks, after 12 weeks, and currently or just before the individual
left the firm. The supervisor was asked to place a rating on a "scale of
4 In a few cases,employers reported that more than 520 hours (13 weeks times
40 hours a week) had been devoted to a specific training activity during the first
3 months on the job. Although the new hire might have received training from
more than one supervisor, it is unlikely that two trainers were simultaneously in
one-on-one contact with the new hire. Consequently, the computer edit of these
data changed all repons of more than 520 hours involved in a training activity
to 520.
5The cost of the trainer was assumed to be two-thirds of the forgone
productivity since formal training often involves more than one trainee. Thus
1.8 = (2/3)1.5 + .8.
6 The index was constructed under an assumption that the four training
activities were mutually exclusive. This implies that, if the sum of the hours
devoted to individual activities is greater than 520, a reponing error has occurred
that overstates investment in training. In the few cases in which the sum of
hours devoted to training exceeded 520, the training-time index was adjusted
downward by the ratio of 520 to the sum of the hours reponed for individual
activities. This procedure reduces the mean of the index by about 10%.
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zero to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of
your employees in [the employee's] position can obtain and zero is
absolutely no productivity by your employee." The mean values of these
indexes of reported productivity were as follows: first 2 weeks, 49.0;
next 10 weeks, 64.6; and current, 81.4.
The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired
employees were intended to provide indicators of the relative productivity
of one worker at different points in time or two different workers in the
identical job. They do not attempt to measure productivity in any
absolute sense and therefore are not comparable across firms or across
jobs in a firm. The questions asking for a rating of the productivity of
particular workers have remarkably low nonresponse rates. Only 4.4%
of respondents asked about a particular new hire's productivity during
the first 2 weeks responded that they did not know or refused to answer.
Comparably defined nonresponse rates for other questions about the
new hire were 8.2% for previous relevant experience, 3.2% for age, 6.7%
for education, 8.6% for time spent in informal training by a supervisor,
and 5.7% for a three-question sequence from which the starting wage
rate is calculated. The low nonresponse rate implies that respondents
felt that they were capable of making such judgments and augurs well
for the quality of the data that result.
In the paper, it is assumed that these productivity indexes are
proportional transformations of true productivity plus a random error.
If employer reports of a worker's productivity are equal to an unknown
constant times the worker's true marginal product plus a random error,
percentage differences in cell means of the productivity index can be
interpreted as unbiased estimators of percentage differences in true
productivity. If the variations in the productivity scores assigned by
supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true produc-
tivity, estimates of percentage effects of productivity on the wage will
be biased downward. Errors in measurement will have the same effect.
Even though it is possible for a worker's true productivity to be negative,
the scale was defined as having a lower limit of zero. Floors and ceilings
on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be negatively correlated
with the true value. If this were the case, the result would be an
understatement of percentage differences between the productivity of
different categories of new hires, and the measurement error bias would
be mitigated somewhat. In my view, this latter type of bias is more
likely than the former.
The validity and conservatism of the proportionality assumption can
be checked by comparing coefficients of variation of productivity in this
and other data sets. The similarity of this estimate of the coefficient of
variation for job incumbents (.18-.19) to Schmidt and Hunter's (1983)
estimate is mentioned in the text. Questionnaire studies that ask super-
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visors to give dollar estimates of the OlitpUt of workers at the fifteenth,
tlftieth, and eighty-tlfth percentiles typically obtain similar estimates.
lvbcManus et al.'s (I986) survey of 349 supervisors for eight different
types of jobs (not paid on a piece-rate basis) for which productivity
measurement was thought to be feasible obtained an average coefficient
of variation of .26.
The fact that the employer is reporting on the past productivity of
particular employees may generate biases in data. Some of these employees
quit or were tlred, and some were promoted. These events might
int1uence a respondent's memory of how productive the worker was
initially and in the weeks preceding a separation. If this occurs, it would
magnify the rclation between productivity and the wage rate and
tUrnover outcomes. This would strengthen the paper's main conclusion
th,lt wage rates of workers with 1 year of tenure on the job only partially
ret1ect productivity differentials within the work group.
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